db02-terra-cc holds no DB role, so the live checks this lane writes can only be run by somebody else

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• wi-cli-venus created · 5w ago
  parent=#3222
• wi-cli-venus note · 5w ago
  T241-ssl-mtxm9r | DSN SHAPE FOR ANY ROLE PROVISIONED FOR THIS FLEET, measured locally by db02-terra-cc 2026-09-11 with pg-connection-string 2.14.0 resolved through require.resolve('pg') - no database touched. How each form parses: (no sslmode) -> NO ssl key at all, meaning pg requests no TLS and raises nothing; sslmode=require -> ssl:{} (Node defaults, rejectUnauthorized true, full verification, which is what breaks against the Supabase pooler chain); sslmode=verify-full -> ssl:{} (same object - the warning is about the alias, not a behaviour difference); sslmode=require&uselibpqcompat=true -> ssl:{rejectUnauthorized:false}; sslmode=no-verify -> ssl:{rejectUnauthorized:false} (IDENTICAL to the previous line); sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=<path> -> ssl:{ca:<file contents>}. RECOMMENDED SHAPE: sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=<the project CA from the Supabase dashboard, Database > SSL>. CONSTRAINT ON IT: sslrootcert is read AT PARSE TIME and THROWS ENOENT if the path is wrong, an error that looks nothing like TLS, so the CA file must exist on every host the DSN is used from, not only the one it was written on. SAY PLAINLY IN WHATEVER GETS PROVISIONED: uselibpqcompat=true&sslmode=require is byte-identical in effect to sslmode=no-verify - encryption WITHOUT identity - so nobody may later read 'sslmode is present' as 'the server is verified'. It is a stopgap, not the fix. CENSUS of ~/.config/postgres/*.env on venus the same day (key names and host:port only, no values): 8 files, 5 loopback PGHOST=127.0.0.1 and unaffected, 3 pointing at aws-1-sa-east-1.pooler.supabase.com:5432 - db-terra-cc and db-venus-cc carry sslmode=require and therefore carry the break, and audit-terra-cc carries NO sslmode at all, so that DSN requests no TLS across the internet to the pooler. None carries uselibpqcompat or sslrootcert. Whether Supavisor refuses or serves a plaintext connection is UNVERIFIED and worth one measurement before anyone concludes either. The aliasing changes again in pg-connection-string v3.0.0 / pg v9.0.0.
• wi-cli-venus note · 5w ago
  T241-ca-mtxm1j | THE CA IS PUBLIC, SO verify-full NEEDS NO DASHBOARD LOGIN. Fetch: curl -sO https://supabase-downloads.s3-ap-southeast-1.amazonaws.com/prod/ssl/prod-ca-2021.crt (HTTP 200, PEM, subject CN=Supabase Root 2021 CA, self-issued root, notAfter Apr 26 2031). https://supabase.com/downloads/prod-ca-2021.crt is a 404 - the S3 URL is the live one. MEASURED 2026-09-11 by db02-terra-cc against aws-1-sa-east-1.pooler.supabase.com with no credential (bogus role, deliberately wrong password): openssl s_client -starttls postgres -CAfile prod-ca-2021.crt returns 'Verify return code: 0 (ok)' on BOTH :5432 and :6543; node-pg with sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=<abs path> reaches '(EAUTHQUERY) user not found in the database' on both ports, which means TLS completed and verification PASSED and the only remaining failure was the role. Control against the system trust store on the same host: 'Verify return code: 19 (self-signed certificate in certificate chain)' - the chain is Supabase's own private root, which is why /etc/ssl/certs cannot verify it and why the CA file is not optional. SO THE ROLE THIS ROW ASKS FOR SHOULD BE PROVISIONED WITH sslmode=verify-full&sslrootcert=<absolute path> FROM THE START, never sslmode=require (the alias that breaks) and never uselibpqcompat/no-verify (rejectUnauthorized:false, encryption without identity). TWO CONSTRAINTS: sslrootcert is read AT PARSE TIME and throws ENOENT if the path is wrong, an error that resembles neither TLS nor auth, so fetch the file before editing the DSN; and the path must be ABSOLUTE, because a relative one resolves against the process CWD and every cron/systemd caller has a different one. Verification after any such edit is \conninfo, not SELECT 1 - the 'SSL connection (protocol: TLSv1.3, cipher: ...)' line is ABSENT on a plaintext connection that otherwise works perfectly.
• wi-cli-venus spec · 5w ago
  T241-objs-mtxm7a | OBJECT LIST for the role, given to db-enamel-cc (who provisions it - pmmaster ruled 2026-09-11 that OPS-191's routing to nw-venus-cc covers provisioning where no owner exists, and one does: db-enamel-cc authored and applied enamel_050/db_terra_cc_ro on this same ref). Class-A design review by audit-terra-cc before any DDL. Six relations, schema public, verb SELECT and nothing else, derived by extracting every FROM/JOIN target from the two scripts this lane exists to run rather than from a category: terraModuloCampos, terraCirugias, terraCirugiaCampos, vocabularyScopes, vocabularyScopeMembers, piezasDentarias. Plus one needing a catalog read this lane cannot do: vLookupOptions, a VIEW used by check-vocabulary-scope-integrity.ts - if it is a classic definer-rights view then SELECT on the view alone suffices and the base table stays ungranted (preferred); if it carries WITH (security_invoker = true) the role also needs SELECT on what it reads. Resolve from pg_class.reloptions / pg_rewrite, do not assume. EXPLICIT REFUSALS, stated so the reach assertion has a target to falsify: no INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE/TRUNCATE anywhere, no sequence usage, no EXECUTE on any function, and no pacientes, terraPracticas or any terraPracticas* child, users, userEmails, emailOutbox, appEvents. If the reach assertion shows this role can read pacientes or terraPracticas by ANY leg - SET ROLE, a definer-rights view, a PUBLIC-held privilege - that is a defect to name before apply. db-enamel-cc asserts REACH, not the grant list, same as enamel_050. This role is deliberately no wider than db_terra_cc_ro: TERRA-241 is about attribution (this lane must stop being unable to run its own checks and must not borrow db-terra-cc's credential), not new reach. DSN terms accepted: password minted by hand post-apply, DM only, never a repo artifact, sslmode=verify-full + absolute CA path from the start, acceptance test is the \conninfo SSL connection line and never SELECT 1.
• wi-cli-venus note · 5w ago
  T241-view-mtxm8b | vLookupOptions RESOLVED from catalog by audit-terra-cc: reloptions empty/NULL (no security_invoker=true), classic definer-rights view, owner postgres; pg_rewrite/pg_depend shows exactly one base relation behind it, public.lookupOptions (ordinary table), no further view layer. So SELECT on the view ALONE is sufficient and lookupOptions stays UNGRANTED - the preferred branch of the two in T241-objs-mtxm7a. FINAL OBJECT LIST IS SEVEN: terraModuloCampos, terraCirugias, terraCirugiaCampos, vocabularyScopes, vocabularyScopeMembers, piezasDentarias, vLookupOptions. SELECT only on all seven, no other verb, and the refusal list is unchanged. audit-terra-cc will re-verify the reach assertion once the DDL lands, same as db_terra_cc_ro's design review - a definer-rights view is itself a reach leg, so 'the view is enough' is a claim the post-apply assertion has to confirm rather than inherit from this note.
• wi-cli-venus spec · 5w ago
  T241-design-v1, sent to audit-terra-cc for Class-A design review before any DDL is authored (db/per-tenant-role-design.md:3). Role db02_terra_cc_ro, SELECT-only login. INHERITED VERBATIM FROM enamel_050: attributes login noinherit nosuperuser nocreatedb nocreaterole noreplication nobypassrls; comment on role; REVOKE-then-GRANT in one transaction (revoke all on all tables/sequences/functions in schema public, revoke all on schema public, then grant usage on schema public stated as the no-op it is on this ref); seven explicit grant select statements; NO alter default privileges, stated as a positive; ACC1-ACC6 as passed including MAINTAIN (PG 17.6 re-confirmed live, has_table_privilege resolves the name); password minted by hand post-apply through execute_sql, DM only, never a repo artifact, sslmode=verify-full with an ABSOLUTE sslrootcert path, acceptance is the conninfo SSL line and never SELECT 1. SEVEN OBJECTS, all re-verified present live 2026-09-12: terraModuloCampos, terraCirugias, terraCirugiaCampos, vocabularyScopes, vocabularyScopeMembers, piezasDentarias, vLookupOptions. lookupOptions stays UNGRANTED; vLookupOptions re-measured by me rather than inherited - relkind v, reloptions NULL, therefore definer-rights, so the view grant alone suffices and is tighter. pacientes and terraPracticas refused, same seal as 050, and that line is not terra auditor territory. TWO DELTAS FROM enamel_050, which are the actual review ask. ACC7 COMPARATIVE BASELINE replaces 050 prose residual footer: mint a zero-grant throwaway role in the same transaction and assert the new role reach OUTSIDE public is IDENTICAL to it, rather than an absolute expectation that would raise on a platform PUBLIC grant enamel cannot revoke (a blocked replay). Prototyped live on eprpywqwzsvrjeaforei: IDENTICAL=t, baseline set exactly cron.job SELECT, cron.job_run_details SELECT and DELETE, extensions.pg_stat_statements and pg_stat_statements_info SELECT, net._http_response and net.http_request_queue each the full eight including MAINTAIN. Fires only when enamel grants something outside public (fixable); immune to Supabase adding a schema or changing a PUBLIC grant, because both roles move together. Spans four legs: has_table_privilege over relkind r v m p f, has_sequence_privilege (net.http_request_queue_id_seq is relkind S and invisible to that filter - the same missed-axis shape as the omitted MAINTAIN), has_function_privilege, has_schema_privilege. Probe role minted and dropped inside the transaction and RAISEs if the name already exists rather than drop-if-exists, because a leaked probe role is a defect to name not to quietly delete; CREATE ROLE is transactional so the aborted prototype left nothing, verified after the run (to_regrole null for both probe names, zero zz_probe_% rows) since it is a cluster-wide catalog op on a shared clinical DB. ACC8 ZERO ROLE MEMBERSHIPS: zero rows in pg_auth_members where member = the role. NOINHERIT blocks inheritance, not SET ROLE; a membership granted later hands the role everything the target holds and has_table_privilege returns false the whole time precisely because inheritance is off - the same mechanism that hid authenticator DELETE on lookupOptions through PostgREST explicit SET ROLE. 050 names SET ROLE as leg three of reach and asserts nothing about it. LEG COVERAGE CHECK, each of the four legs mapped to a numbered arm: own grants = ACC1; PUBLIC = ACC1/ACC2 via has_*_privilege, extended past public by ACC7; SET ROLE = ACC8; definer-rights objects = ACC4 for functions, plus the pg_depend/pg_rewrite source-set assertion for the non-invoker view. Also measured before designing: twelve non-system schemas on this ref (auth cron extensions graphql graphql_public net pgbouncer public realtime storage supabase_migrations vault), zero PUBLIC-readable relations and zero PUBLIC-executable DEFINER functions in public, and db02_terra_cc_ro absent (to_regrole null).
• wi-cli-venus audit-finding · 5w ago
  audit-terra-cc PASSed db02_terra_cc_ro's Class-A design (pre-DDL): 7-object list verified live against db_terra_cc_ro's current grant set - byte-for-byte match, no drift. vLookupOptions confirmed non-security-invoker (runs as owner), so granting the view without lookupOptions is correct and tighter. ACC7 baseline independently re-derived from live ACLs (not the prototype's output): cron.job PUBLIC=r, cron.job_run_details PUBLIC=rd, pg_stat_statements(+_info) PUBLIC=r, net._http_response/http_request_queue PUBLIC=arwdDxtm (full eight), http_request_queue_id_seq relkind S, net.* functions PUBLIC EXECUTE by default - every number confirmed. ACC8 mechanism (pg_auth_members over has_table_privilege for NOINHERIT roles) independently verified against a live case: authenticator is NOINHERIT + member of service_role, pg_has_role(...,'usage')=false but (...,'member')=true - exactly the blind spot ACC8 closes. db-enamel-cc cleared to author.
• wi-cli-venus spec · 5w ago
  T241-file-v1 AUTHORED AND HELD, NOT APPLIED. db/migrations/enamel_061_db02_terra_cc_ro_role.sql, sha256 d38f47355fc164e9564ee2c90c96fca2c74f3c817c6ac4a93307130900b2266f, 412 lines. audit-terra-cc PASSED the design 2026-09-12 before it was authored (Class-A, db/per-tenant-role-design.md:3), re-deriving the object list live and checking every ACC7 baseline number against the catalog directly rather than trusting my prototype output; they also verified the ACC8 mechanism against a real case - authenticator is rolinherit=false and IS a member of service_role, pg_has_role usage reads false while member reads true. File now back with them for the FILE-level review. DRY RUN: whole body against the live catalog with commit replaced by rollback - PASS, ACC1 through ACC9 all executed, zero residual after (to_regrole null for db02_terra_cc_ro and for the probe role zz_enamel061_reach_baseline, zero zz_% roles, db_terra_cc_ro back to zero memberships). EVERY NEW ARM FORCED RED by ADDING one condition rather than by feeding a bad input: ACC1 with the expected array shortened raised naming all seven reachable, which is what proves the block really creates the role and lands all seven grants instead of passing vacuously on a role that was never made; ACC7 with an added grant usage on schema extensions raised EXTRA=[extensions:USAGE] MISSING=[none]; ACC8 with an added grant of db_terra_cc_ro raised naming it; ACC9 with the expected source array widened raised. TWO CHANGES FROM THE PASSED DESIGN, both in reporting not in the predicate, declared rather than slipped in: ACC7 now prints the SYMMETRIC DIFFERENCE instead of both sets, because the first version buried the finding under 700+ characters of platform baseline - and the baseline is far larger than the table-only numbers in the design ping showed, since every NULL-proacl function in auth, cron, extensions and net is EXECUTE-to-PUBLIC by PostgreSQL default, well over a hundred items; and ACC9 was added, the pg_depend/pg_rewrite source-set assertion for vLookupOptions that the leg map called for and that enamel_050 identified but did not contain, asserting the view sources are exactly {lookupOptions}. NEXT ON A PASS: apply with in-transaction registration, push same turn, then mint the password by hand post-apply and DM the DSN to db02-terra-cc only.
• wi-cli-venus audit-finding · 5w ago
  enamel_061 FILE REVIEW: PASS, apply cleared. sha256 d38f47355fc164e9564ee2c90c96fca2c74f3c817c6ac4a93307130900b2266f confirmed exact. 7-object grant array independently re-derived from db_terra_cc_ro's live has_table_privilege set - byte-for-byte match, zero drift. db02_terra_cc_ro + probe role zz_enamel061_reach_baseline both absent from pg_roles pre-apply. PG 17.6 confirmed, MAINTAIN privilege resolves without error. vLookupOptions reloptions NULL/owner=postgres re-confirmed. ACC9 pg_depend/pg_rewrite source set = exactly {lookupOptions}, matches file's assertion. Full file read, ACC1-ACC9 sound, no anomaly vs design-reviewed shape. Not verified: actual apply outcome, password mint, DSN handoff (outside my grants).
• wi-cli-venus verified · 5w ago
  APPLIED, PUSHED, PASSWORD MINTED, DSN DELIVERED. enamel_061 applied with in-transaction registration (version 20260912013831); registered statements[1] md5 d92eccd196b84591635fe4a88c79e6b3 equals the source file (25421 chars / 25422 bytes - the one-byte gap is the accented character in practica, chars vs bytes, not a diff). Pushed 44f8e89. audit-terra-cc passed the DESIGN before authoring and the FILE before apply, both independently re-derived rather than taken from my report: sha256 exact match, the expected seven equal db_terra_cc_ro live SELECT set byte-for-byte, both role names absent pre-apply so ACC7 collision guard could not misfire, PG 17.6 with MAINTAIN resolving, vLookupOptions relkind v / reloptions NULL, and the live pg_depend/pg_rewrite source set for the view exactly {lookupOptions}. POST-APPLY CATALOG STATE: rolcanlogin=true, rolinherit=false, super/bypassrls/createrole/createdb/replication all false, zero pg_auth_members rows, readable set in public exactly the seven, write reach in public zero, pacientes and terraPracticas both false, role comment present, probe role zz_enamel061_reach_baseline absent. AN INSTRUMENT ERROR CAUGHT IN THE SAME PASS AND WORTH THE NOTE: pg_roles.rolpassword is a MASKED column - it reads ******** for every role, so "rolpassword is not null" returned TRUE for a role that had no password at all. pg_authid.rolpassword is the honest catalog and returned false before the mint. Same class as reading a grant list instead of asking has_privilege. Also: obj_description(oid,pg_authid) returns null for a role comment because role comments are SHARED objects living in pg_shdescription - shobj_description is the right function, and the first read looked exactly like a missing COMMENT ON ROLE. LIVE VERIFICATION OVER A REAL CLIENT CONNECTION through the session pooler, not only the catalog: conninfo shows SSL connection TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, current_user db02_terra_cc_ro, PG 17.6; all seven readable and non-empty (terraModuloCampos 6, terraCirugias 78, terraCirugiaCampos 18, piezasDentarias 56, vocabularyScopes 8, vocabularyScopeMembers 77, vLookupOptions 132); refused from statements that PARSE so the error is a privilege error and not a parse error - pacientes, terraPracticas, lookupOptions, delete where false, truncate, and create table in public (which independently confirms public carries USAGE but not CREATE and that the grant usage line is the no-op the file calls it). lookupOptions denied while vLookupOptions returns 132 is the definer-rights view doing exactly the work the design claims. PASSWORD minted by hand post-apply through the query endpoint, never apply_migration, so it is in neither the repo nor migration history; DSN DMd to db02-terra-cc as the only copy outside the DB, with sslmode=verify-full and an absolute sslrootcert path. Not to be rotated on the grounds that it travelled over the hub.
• wi-cli-venus completed · 5w ago
  Role db02_terra_cc_ro live, enamel_061 pushed 44f8e89, DSN delivered to db02-terra-cc. Class-A design and file both passed by audit-terra-cc.
• wi-cli-venus audit-finding · 5w ago
  SELF-AUDIT of the pushed enamel_061 footer (44f8e89), measured 2026-09-12, NOT a defect in any acceptance arm. Lines 369-391 present a list under 'ACC7 makes the role reach outside public equal to a zero-grant role - on this ref that baseline is:' and then list PUBLIC grants on cron.job, cron.job_run_details ('SELECT and DELETE. Not readable - deletable.') and extensions.pg_stat_statements. Framing those as this role's REACH is WRONG, and it is the same wording already corrected once out of enamel_050 via the enamel_053 header: A PUBLIC GRANT IS NOT REACH WHEN A PREREQUISITE SCHEMA HOP DENIES FIRST. Measured just now with has_schema_privilege('db02_terra_cc_ro', n.oid, 'USAGE') over twelve schemas rather than inferred: public=true, net=true, and auth/cron/extensions/storage/graphql/graphql_public/realtime/vault/pgbouncer/supabase_migrations ALL FALSE. CREATE is false on all twelve including public. So cron.job_run_details is not deletable by this role and extensions.pg_stat_statements is not selectable by it - the object ACL says PUBLIC, the hop says no. Same correction applies to the 'well over a hundred items' paragraph at 380-387: has_function_privilege answers from the object ACL ALONE and needs no schema hop, so ACC7's function-leg COUNT is honest as an ACL statement, but the auth./cron./extensions. half of it is NOT CALLABLE by this role. WHAT SURVIVES INTACT is the load-bearing half and the one that matters: schema net carries USAGE to PUBLIC (measured true), so the net.* tables, the sequence and the pg_net entry points ARE real reach for this role as for every login role on this ref, and the ENAMEL-35 outbound-HTTP finding at lines 388-391 stands exactly as written. ACC7 ITSELF IS UNAFFECTED - it is comparative, both roles move together, and its sch leg already measures the hop directly rather than reading the footer. NOT EDITING THE PUSHED FILE: its registered md5 equals the repo md5 and that equality is an asserted property of this lane's apply path. The correction travels in the next migration header instead, same route enamel_053 used.
• wi-cli-venus verified · 5w ago
  ACCEPTANCE-DB02-2026-09-12-A7K3: db02_terra_cc_ro accepted by db02-terra-cc, every provisioner claim re-measured from the credential rather than taken on report. Counts, all seven match db-enamel-cc exactly: terraModuloCampos 6, terraCirugias 78, terraCirugiaCampos 18, piezasDentarias 56, vocabularyScopes 8, vocabularyScopeMembers 77, vLookupOptions 132. Refusals confirmed: pacientes, terraPracticas and lookupOptions all return permission denied for table. Write privileges were read FROM THE CATALOG, not issued: has_table_privilege(current_user, oid, 'INSERT'|'UPDATE'|'DELETE'|'TRUNCATE') over the seven relations returns f on every one with SELECT=t, and has_schema_privilege(current_user,'public','CREATE')=f with USAGE=t. The provisioner proved the same refusals by issuing delete/truncate/create; I did not reproduce that - the fleet read-only order has no test exception and a catalog SELECT answers the question exactly. COVERAGE BOUND: that sweep filtered relkind in ('r','v'), so it establishes nothing about m/p/f relations or about EXECUTE on functions. Acceptance standard was two NEGATIVE controls, each seen to FAIL, in BOTH psql and node-pg - never SELECT 1. A) sslrootcert pointed at a nonexistent path, proving the CA is actually read. B) connect by IP so the name cannot match, proving the NAME check runs, which A cannot show. Positive leg: TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 as db02_terra_cc_ro on PG 17.6, session pooler :5432, sslmode=verify-full with an absolute sslrootcert. Control B refuses with DIFFERENT text per client and the difference is not cosmetic. psql names the IP; node-pg reports Host: localhost. because pg/lib/connection.js:116 sets options.servername only under net.isIP(host) === 0 and pg/lib/stream.js passes tls.connect an already-connected socket with no host, so node falls back to its own default. Reproduced with no pg in the path. It still fails closed, so the control is valid - but it proves a name check ran and refused, never that it checked the configured host. That falsified a line in scripts/check-cirugia-campo-scope-drift.ts already on main, which stated psql's string as universal; corrected in local commit 01f4775 (Local-Author: db02-terra-cc) and handed to coder-terra-cc to push. Second independent measurement under the new role: check-cirugia-campo-scope-drift.ts scopedCampos=3 activeCirugias=48 considered=17 exclusions=9 allowlisted=9 findings=0 staleAllowlist=0 exit 0, and check-vocabulary-scope-integrity.ts 8 categories 77 members 0 orphans exit 0. Credential lives in ~/.config/postgres/db02-terra-cc.env, mode 600, PGURI single-quoted - unquoted, set -a plus a dot-source forks at the & before sslrootcert and the assignment lands in a backgrounded subshell. Not rotated, per the provisioner's standing line that travelling over the hub is not grounds. The pacientes/terraPracticas refusal is held permanently, including against a future ask from this lane; widening is a fresh enamel PM decision, never an amendment.
• wi-cli-venus note · 4w ago
  FLEET STOP (pmmaster relay of Elazar direct, 2026-09-11 23:57) - audit-terra-cc parking here. DONE: TERRA-241 design review PASS + enamel_061 file review PASS, both sent to db-enamel-cc, both logged. ENAMEL-47 full chain (design+enamel_059+portal restore+formal verdict) closed earlier same session, all pushed. NOT DONE / IN FLIGHT: nothing - no uncommitted work, no mid-push state, clean stop point. NEXT ACTION on resume: none queued on my side; awaiting next ping.